American Diplomacy by George F. Kennan
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work, which was a bestseller in the Second World War, Lippmann insisted upon the reality and permanence of the Atlantic community. He gave a trenchant critique of both the insular isolationism of the America Firsters and the universalistic nostrums of the unreconstructed Wilsonians. "One world," as Lippmann would later characteristically express his double-barreled attack on insularity and universalism, "we shall not see in our time. But what we may see, if we have the vision and the energy, is the formation of a great western community, at least a confederation of federations of European and American nations, determined to give the lie to those who say that our civilization is doomed and to give back faith and will to those who fear that freedom is perishing where it originated."

American Diplomacy. BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 154 pp.

These celebrated lectures, delivered at the University of Chicago in 1950, were for many years the most widely read account of American diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century. They were written against the backdrop of the searing experience of total war, and Kennan's strictures against the "legalistic-moralistic" tradition in U.S. foreign policy need to be understood in that light. It was not that Kennan was hostile to law or morality as restraints upon our own conduct; at the root of his opposition to the crusading impulse was the fear that it would subtly erode, if not smash, the barriers to a yet more terrible war. The second edition of this work contains two lectures from 1984 that reconsider the themes of *American Diplomacy* and bemoan "the extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this postwar age." Kennan's worst fears did not come to pass, and it may be that he fell victim to exaggerations comparable to those he deplored in American policymakers. But we have needed his voice to remind us that "there are problems in this world that we will not be able to solve, depths into which it will not be useful or effective for us to plunge, dilemmas in other regions of the globe that will have to find their solution without our involvement."

The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, enlarged edition. BY WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. New York: Dell, 1962, 309 pp.

This influential work by the dean of the Cold War revisionists, first published in 1959, developed a radical critique of American foreign policy. Williams attributed the counterrevolutionary tendency he denounced to a misplaced faith in liberal capitalism, and advised that the United States adopt an "open door" for revolutions. Williams was not a communist, as was sometimes unfortunately alleged, but a radical free-thinker out of the Wisconsin School. Nor was he a realist, though he achieved harmonic convergence with the realists (and the paleoconservatives) on several points: both strains of thought were skeptical of universalism, sought to place limits on the projection of American power, and advised a more accommodating posture toward revolutionary nationalism. Williams was often criticized, and persuasively so, for giving primacy to economic factors in explaining American foreign policy, and his assessment of responsibility for the origins of the Cold War erred on